But there is a different kind of friendship, which involves superiority of one party over the other, for example, the friendship between father and son, and generally between an older person and a younger, and that between husband and wife, and between any ruler and the persons ruled. These friendships also vary among themselves. The friendship between parents and children is not the same as that between ruler and ruled, nor indeed is the friendship of father for son the same as that of son for father, nor that of husband for wife as that of wife for husband; for each of these persons has a different excellence and function, and also different motives for their regard, and so the affection and friendship they feel are different.
Now in these unequal friendships the benefits that one party receives and is entitled to claim from the other are not the same on either side; but the friendship between parents and children will be enduring and equitable, when the children render to the parents the services due to the authors of one's being, and the parents to the children those due to one's offspring. The affection rendered in these various unequal friendships should also be proportionate * i.e., unequal, and proportionate to the benefits received. : the better of the two parties, for instance, or the more useful or otherwise superior as the case may be, should receive more affection than he bestows; since when the affection rendered is proportionate to desert, this produces equality in a sense between the parties, and equality is felt to be an essential element of friendship.
Equality in friendship, however, does not seem to be like equality in matters of justice. In the sphere of justice, ‘equal’ （fair） means primarily proportionate to desert, and ‘equal in quantity’ is only a secondary sense; whereas in friendship ‘equal in quantity’ is the primary meaning, and ‘proportionate to desert’ only secondary.
This is clearly seen when a wide disparity arises between two friends in point of virtue or vice, or of wealth, or anything else; they no longer remain nor indeed expect to remain friends. This is most manifest in the case of the gods, whose superiority in every good attribute is pre-eminent; but it is also seen with princes: in their case also men much below them in station do not expect to be their friends, nor do persons of no particular merit expect to be the friends of men of distinguished excellence or wisdom.
It is true that we cannot fix a precise limit in such cases, up to which two men can still be friends; the gap may go on widening and the friendship still remain * Lit. ‘though many things are taken away, （friendship） still remains’; apparently an allusion to the Sorites fallacy （ ratio ruentis acervi , Hor. Ep. 2.1.47 ） , How many grains can be taken from a heap of corn for it still to be in a heap? ; but when one becomes very remote from the other, as God is remote from man, it can continue no longer.
This gives rise to the question, is it not after all untrue that we wish our friends the greatest of goods? for instance, can we wish them to become gods? for then they will lose us as friends, and therefore lose certain goods, for friends are goods. * It is a contradiction in terms to wish a friend a good that involves a loss of good. If then it was rightly said above * 2.3. that a true friend wishes his friend's good for that friend's own sake, the friend would have to remain himself, whatever that may be; so that he will really wish him only the greatest goods compatible with his remaining a human being. And perhaps not all of these, for everybody wishes good things for himself most of all.